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Abstract—A double-identity fingerprint is a fake fingerprint 
created by combining features from two different fingers, so that 
it has a high chance to be falsely matched with fingerprints from 
both fingers. This paper studies the feasibility of creating double-
identity fingerprints by proposing two possible techniques and 
evaluating to what extent they may be used to fool state-of-the-art 
fingerprint recognition systems. The results of systematic 
experiments suggest that existing algorithms are highly 
vulnerable to this specific attack (about 90% chance of success at 
FAR=0.1%) and that the fingerprint patterns generated might be 
realistic enough to fool human examiners. 
 
Index Terms—Double-identity fingerprints, presentation 




OCUMENT fraud has always been a key enabler for 
organized crime and terrorism. In the last decade, the 
security of e-MRTD (i.e., electronic Machine Readable Travel 
Documents) have been greatly improved by embedding 
electronic features (i.e. chips and encryption) that makes 
forgery very hard. Further, biometric modalities such as face 
and fingerprints have been adopted to link a document (i.e., a 
passport) to its legitimate owner [1].  
While the high uniqueness of biometrics traits should 
ensure a 1-1 link between a document and an individual, 
recent studies demonstrated the feasibility of enrolling a 
double-identity biometrics in e-MRTD with the aim to link a 
single documents to two subjects. The attack described in [2] 
consists of enrolling a face image which is the result of a two 
persons morphing, so that at verification time (i.e. transit 
through an Automatic Border Control gate) the two persons 
can share the same document. Enrolling a double–identity face 
image is highly achievable since: i) in several countries face 
acquisition is not live but relies on printed face photo provided 
by the citizens; ii) officers cannot easily detect morphed faces 
(see experiments reported in [3]).  
This work is aimed at studying the feasibly of creating 
double-identity fingerprints to carry out an attack similar to 
that described in [2]. In fact, even if (unlike face) fingerprint 
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enrolment is always live (i.e., fingerprints are collected at the 
enrollment station), a well manufactured fake fingertip may be 
presented to the scanner if the enrolment procedure is not 
carefully supervised by an officer (often for logistic reasons 
the fingerprint scanner is beyond a glass and is not directly 
visible to the officer).  
An inspiring work on this topic was carried out by Günter 
Schumacher, Jan Löschner and Javier Galbally at the 
European Commission Joint Research Center in Ispra, who 
first proved the feasibility of creating double-identity 
fingerprints1; however, since the creation approach used was 
manual, their conclusions are based on a small number of 
samples, and more systematic evaluations are necessary.  
The idea of fingerprint combination was also explored by 
Othman and Ross in [4] with the aim of creating new virtual 
identities useful to preserve user privacy (by partially 
obscuring information) and to generate cancellable templates. 
It is worth noting that the aim of our technique is exactly the 
contrary: in fact, our double-identity fingerprint should 
produce a high comparison score with the native fingers, while 
Othman and Ross mixed fingerprints are designed to yield a 
low similarity score when compared with the original 
biometrics. 
 A double-identity fingerprint should meet two 
requirements: i) features should be combined in such a way 
that state-of-the-art fingerprint recognition algorithm wrongly 
attribute the resulting fingerprint to both subjects; ii) it should 
be visually realistic (i.e., without evident artifacts) to deceive 
the officer attending the enrolment (who normally has a live 
visual feedback of the user fingerprint).   
Two different approaches (both addressed in this study) could 
be used to combine fingerprints:  
 Feature-level: starts by local orientations, frequencies 
and minutiae derived from original fingerprints and then 
generates a synthetic fingerprint image.  
 Image-level: directly blends portion of original 
fingerprint images. 
The main contributions of this work are: 
 Development of novel fully automatic approaches to 
combine two fingerprints at feature level and image-
level; 
 Comparison of feature- and image-level approaches; 
 Systematic evaluation of the double-identity fingerprint 
attack in a verification scenario typical of an Automatic 
 
1 The outcome of this research is described in a technical report that is not 
publicly available. 
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Border Control (ABC) system. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the procedures to create double-identity fingerprints; 
Section III reports and comments the experimental results 
obtained; finally Section IV draws some concluding remarks. 
II. DOUBLE-IDENTITY FINGERPRINT CREATION PROCESS 
The aim of this process is to create a new fingerprint that 
includes features (i.e., minutiae, local orientations and 
frequencies) of two different fingers. 
Given two fingerprints 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 from two different 
fingers, the following steps are carried out to produce the new 
fingerprint (Fig. 1): 
A. The two fingerprints are superimposed and the best 
alignment is computed.  
B. The optimal cutline is determined by maximizing the 
ridge pattern similarity nearby the cut. 
C. The new double-identity fingerprint is generated. 
The above steps are described in detail in the following 
sections. Table III in the Appendix provides a summary of the 
symbols used throughout this paper. 
A. Fingerprint Alignment 
The proposed technique aligns the two fingerprints by 
maximizing, for any reasonable translation and rotation, the 
ridge orientation similarity in their intersections.  
The local orientations 𝑂1 and 𝑂2 (Fig. 1) of the two 
fingerprints are estimated blockwise (in steps of 𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  pixels), 
along horizontal and vertical axes, by applying the gradient-
based technique proposed in [5] with an averaging window of 
𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 × 𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  pixels. Each orientation element 𝑜𝑖,𝑗 = (𝜃𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑟𝑖,𝑗) 
consists of an angle 𝜃𝑖,𝑗 ∈ [0, 𝜋[ and a value 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 ∈ [0,1],  
denoting the reliability of the estimation (𝑟𝑖,𝑗  is zero for 
elements belonging to the background region). 
In general, the similarity between two local orientation 





















,  (1) 
 
where 𝜓(𝜃1, 𝜃2) is the similarity between two orientation 
angles 𝜃1, 𝜃2: 
 





and 𝑉𝑂 contains the coordinates of foreground orientation 
elements of the local orientation image 𝑂. 
 
𝑉𝑂 = {(𝑖, 𝑗)| 𝑜𝑖,𝑗 ∈ 𝑂 ∧ 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 > 0}. (3) 
 
In order to find the best alignment, all possible translations 
(in steps of 𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  pixels) and rotations (in steps of 𝛿𝛾) of 𝑂
2 
with respect 𝑂1 are evaluated (Fig. 1) by maximizing the 
similarity (Eq. (1)) between 𝑂1 and the aligned 𝑂2. Moreover, 
to discard alignments with very small overlapping, the 







≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑉𝑅. (4) 
B. Optimal Cutline Estimation 
The optimal cutline is determined by attempting to 
simultaneously achieve the following objectives: 
1. maximize the similarity of ridge pattern in the 
neighborhood of the cutline itself,  
2. preserve a sufficient number of minutiae from both the 
original fingerprints. 
The former objective is aimed at generating a fingerprint 
pattern that looks realistic to the human eye near the cutline 
(i.e., the most critical region). The latter helps to create a 
fingerprint that has a high chance to be matched with 
fingerprints from both the fingers. 
Let (𝑑𝑥∗, 𝑑𝑦∗, 𝛾∗), be the best translation and rotation 




2 are obtained by aligning fingerprint 𝐹2 and its 
local orientations 𝑂2 according to (𝑑𝑥∗, 𝑑𝑦∗, 𝛾∗), 
respectively (Fig. 1).  
 ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 are the intersection regions of 𝐹1 and 𝐹𝐴
2, 
respectively (Fig. 1). 
 ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 are the intersection regions of 𝑂1 and 𝑂𝐴
2, 
respectively (Fig. 2). 
The local ridge-line frequencies 𝛶1 and 𝛶2of ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 are 
estimated as described in [5] (Fig. 3). Each frequency element 
is a value 𝜈𝑖,𝑗 ∈ ℝ, denoting the inverse of the average ridge-
line period estimated in a neighborhood. 
Minutiae templates 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 are extracted from ?̂?1 and 
?̂?2, respectively, using the algorithm described in [6] (Fig. 4). 
Each minutia 𝑚 is a quadruple 𝑚 = {𝑥𝑚 , 𝑦𝑚, 𝜃𝑚, 𝑡𝑚}, where 
𝑥𝑚 and 𝑦𝑚 are the minutia location, 𝜃𝑚 is the minutia 
direction and 𝑡𝑚 is the minutia type (i.e., termination or 
bifurcation). 
Let 𝜌 = (𝜌𝑥, 𝜌𝑦) be the barycenter of the intersection 
region; the line 𝑙 passing through 𝑝 with angle 𝛽 is defined as: 
 
𝑎𝑙 ⋅ 𝑥 + 𝑏𝑙 ⋅ 𝑦 + 𝑐𝑙 = 0
𝑎𝑙 = sin(𝛽) , 𝑏𝑙 = cos(𝛽) , 𝑐𝑙 = −𝜌𝑥 ⋅ sin(𝛽) − 𝜌𝑦 ⋅ cos(𝛽)
. (5) 
 
For each angle 𝛽 ∈ [0, 𝜋[ (in steps of 𝛿𝛽), the following score 
is computed: 
 
𝑆𝑐 = 𝜔𝑜 ∙ 𝑆𝑜 + 𝜔𝜈 ∙ 𝑆𝜈 + 𝜔𝑚 ∙ 𝑆𝑚, (6) 
 
where: 
 𝑆𝑜 and 𝑆𝜈 measure the similarity of the ridge orientations 
and frequencies, respectively, nearby the cutline 𝑙 (with 
the aim of generating a pattern realistic to the human 
eye); 
 𝑆𝑚 is a score derived from the two minutiae templates 
(described in the following paragraphs) with the aim of 
generating a fingerprint that matches with both fingers; 






































Fig. 2 Detail of the intersection regions between the two aligned local 
orientations in Fig. 1. The orientation elements used to compute 𝑆𝑜 are 
highlighted. P and N represent the positive and the negative side with respect 
to the cutline 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Detail of the local ridge-line frequencies estimated from the intersection 
regions in Fig. 1. Light blocks denote higher frequencies. The elements used 
to compute 𝑆𝜈 are highlighted. P and N represent the positive and the negative 
side with respect to the cutline 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Detail of the minutiae extracted from the intersection regions in Fig. 1. 
P and N represent the positive and the negative side with respect to the cutline 
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥. The dark and gray minutiae are those used in Eq. (11) to compute 
ζ𝑚(𝑇
1, 𝑇2) and ζ𝑚(𝑇























𝐶 contains the element coordinates whose distance from 𝑙 is 
less or equal to 𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥  and where both local orientation images 
present non-null elements (see the highlighted regions in Fig. 
2 and Fig. 3): 
 
𝐶 = {(𝑖, 𝑗)| (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ (𝑉?̂?1 ∩ 𝑉?̂?𝐴






















𝑁 denote the cardinalities of the minutiae in 
𝑇 that fall in the positive or negative side of line 𝑙, 
respectively (see Fig. 4): 
 
|𝑇|𝑙
𝑃 = |{𝑚 ∈ 𝑇| 𝜙𝑙(𝑚𝑥, 𝑚𝑦) ≥ 0}|, (13) 
 
|𝑇|𝑙
𝑁 = |{𝑚 ∈ 𝑇| 𝜙𝑙(𝑚𝑥 , 𝑚𝑦) < 0}|. (14) 
 
𝑍 is a sigmoid function, controlled by two parameters (𝜇𝑚 and 
𝜏𝑚), that limits the contribution of the cardinality operator 
(|⋅|), and ensures that the final value is in the range [0,1]. The 
sigmoid function is defined as: 
 





Finally, the line 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 with the maximum score 𝑆𝑐 is selected 
as the cutline. 
C. Double-Identity Fingerprint Generation 
Two different approaches for generating double-identity 
fingerprints are described. Starting from the information 
computed in Sections II.A and II.B, the former approach 
creates a new synthetic fingerprint starting from combined 
local orientations, frequencies and minutiae, while the latter 
produces a new fingerprint by directly blending the two 
original fingerprints. 
 
1) Feature-level Approach 
As described in [7] [8], a realistic fingerprint can be 
synthetically reconstructed starting from the information 
available in a standard minutiae template and attempting to 
estimate various aspects of the original unknown fingerprint 
(i.e., fingerprint area, local orientations and frequencies).  
Given the cutline 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 , the fingerprint information used to 
reconstruct the positive (𝑝) and the negative (𝑛) portions of 
the new image is selected, on the basis of the resulting number 
of minutiae (see Eq. (12)), as follows: 
 
(𝑝, 𝑛) = {
(1,2) if ζ𝑚(𝑇





 The double-identity local orientations ?̃?, frequencies ?̃? and 
minutiae template ?̃? (see Fig. 5) are then computed by 
























?̃?(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ ?̂?𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) + (1 − 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥) ⋅ ?̂?𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦), (17) 
 
?̃? (𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ 𝛶𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) + (1 − 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥) ⋅ 𝛶𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦), (18) 
 
?̃? = {𝑚 ∈ 𝑇𝑝, 𝜙𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑚𝑥, 𝑚𝑦) ≥ 0} ∪ {𝑚 ∈ 𝑇
𝑛 , 𝜙𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑚𝑥, 𝑚𝑦) < 0}, (19) 
 
where 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∈ [0,1] is a weighting factor to balance the 




1 − max (0,
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥,𝑦)
2⋅𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥








Note that, to avoid angle circularity problems [9], the 
computation of angles ?̃? (17) is actually performed as 
explained in [10] (i.e., by doubling the angles and summing x 
and y components separately). 
Finally, the double-identity fingerprint 𝐷𝐹  (see Fig. 5.d) is 
synthetically generated by the method  proposed  in [7], using 
?̃?, ?̃? and ?̃? as input. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Local orientations ?̃? (a), frequencies ?̃? (b) and minutiae ?̃? (c), derived 
from the fingerprints in Fig. 1 used to synthetically generate the double-
identity fingerprint 𝐷𝐹 (d). 
 
2) Image-level Approach 
The double-identity fingerprint is generated by fusing ?̂?1 
and ?̂?2 according to the cutline 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 . Let ?̂?
𝑝 and ?̂?𝑛 be the 
positive and the negative aligned original fingerprints (with 
respect to 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥), respectively, selected on the basis of the 
resulting number of minutiae (see Eq. (16)), the double-
identity fingerprint 𝐷𝐼  (see Fig. 6) is then generated as: 
 
𝐷𝐼  (𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⋅ ?̂?𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) + (1 − 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥) ⋅ ?̂?𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦). (21) 
 
 
Fig. 6 Double-identity fingerprint 𝐷𝐼 generated starting from the fingerprints 
in Fig. 1 using the image-level approach.  
III. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
This section describes the experiments carried out to 
evaluate the possibility of success of the proposed attack by 
estimating the behaviour of automatic fingerprint recognition 
in presence of double-identity fingerprints. 
A.  Database and Testing Protocol 
The experiments have been carried out on the FVC2002 
DB1 database [11], containing 800 fingerprints from 100 
fingers (8 impressions per finger) captured at 500dpi using the 
optical scanner “TouchView II” by Identix. This dataset has 
been selected because of its clean background, that is typical 
of high quality scanners used for electronic document 
enrolment.  
For each generation approach, 100 double-identity 
fingerprints (see examples reported in Fig. 7) have been 
produced as follows: 
1. The first impression 𝐹𝑖 of each finger 𝑖 is aligned (see 
Section II.A) with the first impression of 10 other 
randomly chosen fingers  and the optimal cutline is 
computed as described in Section II.B. The first 
impression 𝐹𝑗 of finger 𝑗 (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) presenting the maximum 
ridge pattern similarity score 𝑆𝑐 with 𝐹𝑖 (see Eq. (6)) is 
selected as the optimal companion for fusion. We limited 
to 10 the size of the search set to prove that finding a 
reasonably good companion fingerprint for creating an 
effective double-identity fingerprint is quite simple. 
2. 𝐹𝑖 and 𝐹𝑗 are fused into a new fingerprint (𝐷𝑖,𝑗
𝐹  or 𝐷𝑖,𝑗
𝐼 ) 









Fig. 7 Double-identity fingerprints: the results obtained with three fingerprint couples. Two input images (columns 𝐹1 and 𝐹2), the corresponding best alignment 
and the optimal cutline, and the resulting feature- and image-level double-identity fingerprints (columns 𝐷𝐹 and 𝐷𝐼) are reported for each row.  
 
Finally, the following comparisons are performed: 
 genuine – each fingerprint is compared against the 
remaining ones of the same finger. If fingerprint 𝐹𝐴 is 
compared against 𝐹𝐵, the symmetric comparison is not 
executed to avoid correlation in the scores. The total 
number of genuine comparisons is 2800. 
 impostor – the first impression of each finger is 
compared against the first impression of the remaining 
fingers. If fingerprint 𝐹𝐴 is compared against 𝐹𝐵, the 
symmetric comparison is not executed to avoid 
correlation in the scores. The total number of impostor 
comparisons is 4950. 
 double-identity – each double-identity fingerprint 
(𝐷𝑖,𝑗
𝐹  or 𝐷𝑖,𝑗
𝐼 ) is compared against all other seven  
impressions of fingers 𝑖 and 𝑗. The total number of 
double-identity comparisons is 1400 for each generation 
approach. 
Table I reports the parameter values used; all parameters 
have been calibrated on a separate data set containing 80 
fingerprints from 10 fingers (8 impressions per finger). The 
calibration procedure consisted in an exhaustive search over a 
reasonable range of values. 
B. Automatic Fingerprint Recognition SDKs Evaluated 
The experiments have been conducted using two state-of-
the-art fingerprint recognition SDKs: the Neurotechnology 
VeriFinger SDK v6.0 (VF) [12] and the Minutia Cylinder-
Code SDK v2.0 (MCC) [13] [14]. Since the MCC SDK works 
directly with minutiae templates, the minutiae extraction 




PARAMETER VALUES USED IN THE EXPERIMENTATION 
Parameter(s) Description Value 
𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
Block and window size used in local orientation 
and frequency estimation (in pixel) 
4, 23 
𝛿𝛾 






Minimum overlapping between two local 



























Maximum distance used to define the 
neighborhood of the cutline (in pixel) 
30 





In order to simulate a realistic attack to an ABC system, the 
operational thresholds of both fingerprint recognition software 
have been set according to the FRONTEX guidelines [15] 
𝐹1 𝐹2 𝐷𝐼  𝐷𝐹  Alignment and cutline 




[16]. In particular, for ABC systems operating in verification 
mode, the fingerprint verification algorithm has to ensure a 
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) equal to 0.1% and a False 
Rejection Rate (FRR) lower than 3%. VF provides the 
corresponding score thresholds in its documentation, whereas 
for MCC, the score thresholds have been computed on the 
basis of about 110000 impostor comparisons performed on a 
disjoint database. 
Table II reports score thresholds for both SDKs and 
different values of FAR. 
 
TABLE II 
THRESHOLDS TO ACHIEVE DIFFERENT VALUES OF FAR FOR BOTH SDKS 
SDK 
FAR (%) 
1 0.1 0.01 
VF 24 36 48 
MCC 0.1083 0.1205 0.1329 
C. Results 
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the score distribution graphs for VF 
and MCC, respectively. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 report the values 
of Double-identity Acceptance Rate (DAR) and FRR at 
different values of FAR for VF and MCC SDKs, respectively. 
It is quite evident that for both the SDK the majority of attack 
scores are higher than the FRONTEX recommended 
thresholds corresponding to FAR = 0.1%.  
While MCC seems to be slightly more robust than VF 
(compare DAR’s in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11), both algorithms 




Fig. 8 The VF score distribution graph on the FVC2002 DB1 dataset. 
 
The image-level approach proved to be more effective than 
feature-level approach in terms of percentage of successful 
attacks. This behavior is probably due to the particular nature 
of the synthetic generation technique used in the feature-level 
approach [7]. In fact, in order to generate a realistic pattern, it 
involves an iterative filtering procedure that may cause some 
original minutiae to be slightly shifted or completely removed, 
or false minutiae to be introduced. On the other hand, the 
image-level approach exactly preserves the positions of all the 
minutiae that are not close to the cutline, often resulting in a 
higher chance of successful attacks. Furthermore, the image-
level approach allows to generate more realistic images 
(compare the last two columns of Fig. 7), even if in a few 
cases 𝐷𝑖,𝑗
𝐼  presents more artifacts than 𝐷𝑖,𝑗
𝐹  (see Fig. 12). 
 
 
Fig. 9 The MCC score distribution graph on the FVC2002 DB1 dataset. 
 
 
Fig. 10 DAR and FRR values computed at different levels of FAR for VF 
SDK on the FVC2002 DB1 dataset. 
 
 
Fig. 11 DAR and FRR values computed at different levels of FAR for MCC 







































































Fig. 12 Example of a double-identity fingerprint where the cutline and the 
blending region are more evident in the image-level result (a), than in the 
feature-level one (b). In particular, note the presence of orthogonal ridge lines 
in the bottom left corner of (a). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we introduced two automated approaches to 
create double-identity fingerprints by combining two real 
ones. As discussed in [2] [3], two individuals, a criminal and 
an accomplice (with no criminal record) could combine their 
fingerprints and introduce the resulting double-identity 
fingerprint in an electronic document to be used (by both 
persons) to pass Automatic Border Control gates. We proved 
that two state-of-the-art fingerprint recognition algorithms are 
highly vulnerable to this specific attack (about 90% chance of 
success at FAR = 0.1%) and we guess that the majority of 
existing fingerprint recognition algorithms are vulnerable as 
well.  
To mitigate the risk of this attack, particular care should be 
taken by officers in charge of the enrolment process to avoid 
the possibility that a citizen provides fake fingerprints. 
Presentation attack detection techniques (hardware/software) 
are being continuously improved but nowadays they are still 
far to be perfect [17] so visual inspection of the finger surface 
still remains the preferred option.  
Developing software countermeasures, to detect if a given 
fingerprint is a double-identity fingerprint or not, seems 
feasible, and probably not too hard if the input were a digital 
image such as those printed in Fig. 7. However, we believe 
that the approach in reality is much more complex because the 
digital double-identity fingerprint is used only as starting point 
to fabricate a fake finger whose surface will be acquired by a 
live scanner, thus loosing much of the digital traces that could 
have been detected. 
Finally, fingerprint recognition algorithms to be used in 
ABC could be extended/improved to detect “anomalies” (i.e., 
atypical partial matches) during unattended fingerprint 
recognition. We plan to dedicate some of our future research 
to investigate this option, to explore its efficacy and evaluate 
the risk of FRR increase. For instance, a feasible approach 
could be based on the analysis of minutiae correspondence 
groups, looking for suspicious partial matches with respect to 
the foreground intersection. 
  
(a) (b) 






DESCRIPTIONS OF SYMBOLS USED IN THIS PAPER 
Symbol Description First introduced in Section 
𝐹1, 𝐹2 The two fingerprints (from two different fingers) to be mixed II 
   𝑂1, 𝑂2 Local orientation maps of 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 
II.A 
𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 Block size used in local orientation and frequency estimation  
𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 Window size for local orientation and frequency estimation  
𝑜𝑖,𝑗 = (𝜃𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑟𝑖,𝑗) An orientation element [𝑖, 𝑗] with ridge orientation 𝜃𝑖,𝑗 and reliability 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 
𝑆(𝑂1, 𝑂2) Similarity between two local orientation images 
𝜓(𝜃1, 𝜃2) Similarity between two orientation angles 𝜃1, 𝜃2 
𝑉𝑂 Coordinates of foreground orientation elements of 𝑂 
𝛿𝛾 Rotation step used when searching for the best alignment 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑉𝑅 Minimum allowed overlapping between two orientation images 
   (𝑑𝑥∗, 𝑑𝑦∗, 𝛾∗) Best translation and rotation parameters 
II.B 
𝐹𝐴
2 Result of aligning 𝐹2 according to (𝑑𝑥∗, 𝑑𝑦∗, 𝛾∗) parameters 
𝑂𝐴
2 Result of aligning 𝑂2 according to (𝑑𝑥∗, 𝑑𝑦∗, 𝛾∗) parameters 
?̂?1 Portion of  𝐹1 that lies in the intersection with  𝐹𝐴
2 
?̂?1, 𝛶1 Orientations and frequencies of ?̂?1, respectively 
?̂?2 Portion of  𝐹𝐴
2 that lies in the intersection with  𝐹1 
?̂?2, 𝛶2 Orientations and frequencies of ?̂?2, respectively 
𝜈𝑖,𝑗 Average ridge-line frequency estimated in [𝑖, 𝑗] 
𝑇1, 𝑇2 Minutiae templates extracted from ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 
𝑚 = {𝑥𝑚, 𝑦𝑚, 𝜃𝑚, 𝑡𝑚} A minutia with location (𝑥𝑚, 𝑦𝑚), direction 𝜃𝑚, and type 𝑡𝑚 
𝜌 = (𝜌𝑥, 𝜌𝑦) Barycenter of the intersection region 
𝛽 Angle that line 𝑙 forms with the horizontal axis 
𝑙 Line passing through 𝜌 with angle 𝛽, as in Eq. (5) 
𝛿𝛽 Rotation step used during the optimal line estimation 
𝑆𝑜 Similarity of the ridge orientations nearby line 𝑙 as in Eq. (7) 
𝑆𝜈 Similarity of the ridge frequencies nearby line 𝑙 as in Eq. (8) 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹 , 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹 Minimum and maximum ridge frequency 
𝑆𝑚 Score derived from the number of minutiae in 𝑇
1 and 𝑇2 as in Eq. (11) 
𝜔𝑜, 𝜔𝜈, 𝜔𝑚 Three weighting factors in Eq. (6) 
𝑆𝑐 Score maximized to select the optimal cutline 
𝐶 Coordinates of foreground neighborhood elements of line 𝑙 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥 Parameter controlling neighborhood size of line 𝑙  
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙(𝑥, 𝑦) Euclidean distance of point (𝑥, 𝑦) from line 𝑙 
|𝑇|𝑙
𝑃, |𝑇|𝑙
𝑁 Number of minutiae in 𝑇 that fall in the positive (P) or negative (N) side of line 𝑙 
𝑍(𝑣, 𝜇, 𝜏) Sigmoid function, see Eq. (15) 
𝜇𝑚, 𝜏𝑚 Sigmoid parameters in Eq. (12) 
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 Cutline selected by maximizing 𝑆𝑐 
   
?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃? Double-identity orientations, frequencies, and minutiae 
II.C.1 𝑤𝑥,𝑦
𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 Blend weighting factor in Eq. (20) 
𝐷𝐹 The double-identity fingerprint generated using the feature-level approach 
   
𝐷𝐼 The double-identity fingerprint generated using the image-level approach II.C.2 
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